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EQUAL ELECTORAL OPPORTUNITY: THE
SUPREME COURT REEVALUATES THE USE OF
RACE IN REDISTRICTING IN
JOHNSON v. DE GRANDY*
Matthew W Dietz"
INTRODUCTION
The Voting Rights Act' ensures a constitutionally protected
minority's right to have a voice in government. Congress enacted
it to abolish both overt restraints on voting and registration and
more subtle impediments caused by districting schemes that dilute
minority electoral strength. To remedy a dilutive scheme that
violates the Voting Rights Act, legislators commonly create single-
member districts in which the minority has a majority of the
electorate sufficient to elect a candidate of the minority's choice.2
114 S. Ct. 2647 (1994).
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Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973 to 1973bb-1(1988)).
2 A single-member district is a district in which one representative is elected;
an at-large or multi-member district is a large district where many representatives
are elected. See, e.g., Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 85-87 (1986)
(illustrating alternate districting plans and their effects on minority voting
strength). In an at-large or multi-member districting scheme, the political, social,
or racial majority of the population could elect all of the representatives of the
area. Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 616 (1982). When these larger districts are
split into single-member districts, the members of the minority of the larger area
will be able to comprise a majority of one or more of these smaller districts (a
majority-minority district) and elect candidates of their choice. Id.
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In Thornburg v Gingles,3 the U.S. Supreme Court delineated the
factors necessary to find a violation of section 2 of the Voting
Rights Act4 and compel the creation of single-member, majority-
minority districts.
Recently, in Johnson v De Grandy,5 the Court devalued the
weight of the Gingles factors and reevaluated the limits of remedial
action to enhance minority voting opportunity by redistricting. In
De Grandy, the Court rejected a section 2 challenge brought by a
Hispanic minority against a proposed redistricting plan that would
give the minority roughly proportional representation in the Florida
Senate and House of Representatives.6 The De Grandy plaintiffs
claimed that if they could satisfy the requirements that were set by
Gingles,7 then the state would be required to maximize the number
of minority districts However, the Court held that minorities are
limited to a number of districts proportionate to the minority
3 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
4 Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act provides as follows:
(a) No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard,
practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or
political subdivision in a matter which results in a denial or abridge-
ment of the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account
of race or color, or in contravention of the guarantees set forth in
section 4(f)(2), as provided in subsection (b).
(b) A violation of subsection (a) is established if, based on the
totality of circumstances, it is shown that the political processes leading
to nomination or election in the State or political subdivision are not
equally open to participation by members of a class of citizens
protected by subsection (a) in that its members have less opportunity
than other members of the electorate to participate in the political
process and to elect representatives of their choice. The extent to which
members of a protected class have been elected to office in the State
or political subdivision is one circumstance which may be considered:
Provided, That nothing in this section establishes a right to have
members of a protected class elected in numbers equal to their
proportion in the population.
42 U.S.C. § 1973.
' 114 S. Ct. 2647 (1994).
6 Id. at 2651.
7 Id. at 2652.
8Id
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voting-age population.9 To prove a section 2 violation, the Court
proposed a new "totality of the circumstances" test, whereby, after
an extensive review, the court would determine if the overall
circumstances have an effect on the electoral opportunity of the
minority population." Thus, this new De Grandy test transfers the
Court's focus from voting behavior to discriminatory practices and
effects to determine if minority voting opportunity is diluted.
Proportionality" is a central aspect of the totality of the circum-
stances, but it is not dispositive in determining whether a districting
plan is free from a section 2 violation.
2
The Court's analysis in De Grandy further obfuscates the
already confusing jurisprudence of dilution claims under the Voting
Rights Act. After reviewing the history of these claims under the
Voting Rights Act and the Constitution, this Comment surveys how
lower courts have interpreted the De Grandy standard in single-
member and multi-member districts. This Comment analyzes the
effects of maximization of minority voting strength and proportion-
ality in determining a violation of section 2. Furthermore, this
Comment argues that a court lacks an appropriate standard to
measure dilution claims without the predominant factor of propor-
tionality. Although continuing use of proportionality as the
dispositive factor perpetuates racial division in society, it at least
guarantees minorities a modicum of representation. Finally, this
Comment urges courts to use a standard other than race to
determine the composition of districts. The practice of relying on
racial population to delineate single-member districts is not required
by the Voting Rights Act and is contrary to the objectives of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
9 Id. at 2658.
10 Id.
" The Court defines proportionality as "the number of majority-minority
voting districts to minority members' share of the relevant population.. ." in
order for the minority to have an equal opportunity to elect their chosen
representatives. Id. at 2658 n. 11; see infra note 77.
12 De Grandy, 114 S. Ct. at 2658-59.
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I. HISTORY OF VOTING DILUTION CLAIMS' 3
After more than a century of discrimination and disenfranchise-
ment of African Americans, Congress enacted the Voting Rights
Act of 196514 "to rid the country of racial discrimination in
voting."15 The Voting Rights Act immediately produced a dra-
matic increase in minority voter registration. 16 Subsequently, states
devised other methods to discriminate against minority voters and
render the new minority vote meaningless.' 7 These methods
included the creation of devices to dilute the minority vote in the
majority voting pool, such as racial gerrymandering,"8 majority
'" For background on the history of the Voting Rights Act, see generally
Chandler Davidson, The Voting Rights Act: A Brief History, in CONTROVERSIES
IN MINORITY VOTING: THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT IN PERSPECTIVE 7-51 (Bernard
Grofinan & Chandler Davidson eds., 1992).
14 42 U.S.C. § 1973.
"5 South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 315 (1966).
After enduring nearly a century of widespread resistance to the
Fifteenth Amendment, Congress has marshalled an array of potent
weapons against the evil [of discrimination and disenfranchisement],
with authority in the Attorney General to employ them effectively.
... We here hold that the portions of the Voting Rights Act properly
before us are a valid means for carrying out the commands of the
Fifteenth Amendment. Hopefully, millions of non-white Americans
will now be able to participate for the first time on an equal basis in
the government under which they live.
Id. at 337.
16 Davidson, supra note 13, at 21.
"7 "[E]very citizen has an inalienable right to full and effective participation
in the political process ... [which requires] that each citizen have an equally
effective voice in the election of members of his state legislature." Reynolds v.
Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 565 (1964). Dilution schemes may operate "to minimize or
cancel out the voting strength of racial or political elements of the voting
population." Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433, 439 (1965).
1 Racial gerrymandering occurs when a state purposely draws districts to
split a distinct population or unreasonably concentrates this population in a few
districts to minimize the voting power of the minority. Compare Gomillion v.
Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 347 (1960) (holding that a state violated the Fifteenth
Amendment by creating a many-sided district for the sole purpose of excluding
African Americans from the district) with Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993)
500
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runoffs, 9 anti-single-shot voting laws,2" annexation21 and at-
large and multi-member districting.22
Prior to 1980, a minority only needed to show how the electoral
mechanism diluted minority voting strength to prove illegal racial
dilution.23 In 1980, the Supreme Court held that the plaintiff must
also demonstrate a discriminatory purpose to prove a dilution
claim.24 In response to this decision, Congress amended the
Voting Rights Act, eliminating the need to show a discriminatory
(invalidating an unusually shaped district that was created solely to increase the
number of minority districts).
,9 A majority runoff occurs when no candidate receives over 50% of the
vote and the two candidates with the largest number of votes must run against
each other in a subsequent election. This affects minority voting strength by
guaranteeing electoral success for the majority which could assemble the largest
block vote. See, e.g., White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 766 (1973).
20 Such laws require a voter to vote for as many candidates as the number
of offices available and prohibit a voter from concentrating her vote for one
candidate. See City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156 (1980).
21 An annexation (or consolidation) of an electoral area could dilute minority
votes if the annexation increased the White population. A proscribed annexation
occurs when a political subdivision expands its borders to incorporate areas with
predominately White voters at the expense of diluting minority voting strength.
See City of Pleasant Grove v. United States, 479 U.S. 462 (1987); City of Port
Arthur v. United States, 459 U.S. 159 (1982); City of Petersburg v. United
States, 354 F. Supp 1021 (D.D.C. 1972), aff'd, 410 U.S. 962 (1973).
22 At-large and multi-member districts submerge the minority in a majority
so that a minority candidate can never be elected and minority voters will not
have influence in the political process. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30
(1986); see also Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 617 (1982) (finding that at-large
and multi-member districts are not unconstitutional per se); Allen v. State Bd.
of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 568 (1969) (finding that a change from single-
member districts to an at-large district would "nullify [the ability of the minority]
to elect the candidate of their choice just as would prohibiting some of them
from voting").
23 In Whitcomb v. Chavis, the Court stated that if the use of a multi-member
district "minimize[s] or cancel[s] out the voting strength of racial or political
elements of the voting population," then the district would be subject to
challenge. 403 U.S. 124, 144 (1971). Also, in White v. Regester, the Court
invalidated a multi-member district because of the history of discriminatory
treatment of minorities. 412 U.S. at 755.
24 City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 65-66 (1980) (holding that
discriminatory intent or purpose must be shown to prove a claim under § 2).
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intent.25 Congress intended to embrace the White-Zimmer "results
test,, 26 which focused on an "intensely local appraisal" of the
history and electoral system of a state or political subdivision to
determine whether the minority was invidiously deprived of
political and electoral opportunity.2" The factors involved in
determining the totality of the circumstances referred to in section
2(b) include the following:
1. The extent of any history of official discrimination in
the State or political subdivision that touched the right of
the members of the minority group to register, to vote or
otherwise to participate in the democratic process;
2. The extent to which voting in the elections of the State
or political subdivision is racially polarized;
3. The extent to which the State or political subdivision has
used unusually large election districts, majority vote
requirements, anti-single shot provisions, or other voting
practices or procedures that may enhance the opportunity
for discrimination against the minority group;
25 42 U.S.C. § 1973(2) (1988)
The amendment to the language of Section 2 is designed to make clear
that plaintiffs need not prove a discriminatory purpose in the adoption
or maintenance of the challenged system of practice in order to
establish a violation. Plaintiffs must either prove such intent, or,
alternatively, must show that the challenged system or practice, in the
contexts of all the circumstances in the jurisdiction in question, results
in minorities being denied equal access to the political process.
S. REP. No. 417, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 27 (1982), reprinted in 1982
U.S.C.C.A.N. 205. For background on the House and Senate hearings, see
generally ABIGAIL M. THERNSTROM, WHOSE VOTES COUNT? AFFIRMATIVE
ACTION AND MINORITY VOTING RIGHTS 79-136 (1987) (claiming that the push
toward the amendment of the Voting Rights Act was due to the concentrated
efforts of special interest groups that characterized legislation of civil rights
issues as a litmus test for sensitivity to African American interests).
26 White, 412 U.S. 755; Whitcomb, 403 U.S. 124; Zimmer v. McKeithen,
485 F.2d 1297 (5th Cir. 1973), aff'd sub nom. East Carroll Parish Sch. Bd. v.
Marshall, 424 U.S. 636 (1976); S. REP. NO. 417, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 28 (1982),
reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 205.
27 White, 412 U.S. at 769-70.
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4. If there is a candidate slating process, whether the
members of the minority group have been denied access to
that process;
5. The extent to which members of the minority group in
the State or political subdivision bear the effects of
discrimination in such areas as education, employment and
health, which hinder their ability to participate effectively
in the political process;
6. Whether political campaigns have been characterized by
overt or subtle racial appeals;
7. The extent to which members of the minority group
have been elected to public office in the jurisdiction.
Additional factors that in some cases have had proba-
tive value as part of plaintiffs' evidence to establish a
violation are:
Whether there is a significant lack of responsiveness on
the part of the elected officials to the particularized needs
of the members of the minority group.
Whether the policy underlying the State or political
subdivision's use of such voting qualification, prerequisite
to voting, or standard, practice or procedure is tenuous.28
Opponents criticize the White-Zimmer test because the Supreme
Court left lower courts without adequate guidance as to what
measure of these factors would constitute a violation of the Voting
Rights Act.2 9
Thornburg v Gingles30 was the Court's first opportunity to
interpret the Voting Rights Act after the 1982 amendments. Gingles
28 S. REP. No. 417, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 28-29 (1982), reprinted in 1982
U.S.C.C.A.N. 206-07. Congress did not make this list all-inclusive, and one or
more of the factors may be present in a dilution scheme. Id.
29 Samuel Issacharoff, Polarized Voting and the Political Process: The
Transformation of Voting Rights Jurisprudence, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1833, 1844-48
(1992). Professor Issacharoff compares the totality of the circumstances review
in the results test to Justice Potter Stewart's "I know it when I see it" standard
to evaluate unprotected pornography. Id. at 1845 (quoting Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378
U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring)); see also Davidson, supra note
13, at 32-34 (claiming that lack of priority in the factors left plaintiffs without
guidance).
30 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
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involved a section 2 challenge to North Carolina's use of multi-
member legislature districts.3' The Court discarded the results test
in favor of a clear and simplified three-prong analysis.32 The first
condition that a plaintiff must satisfy to prevail on a dilution claim
is that the minority group is large and compact enough to comprise
a majority in a single-member district.33 Second, the minority
group must be "politically cohesive., 34 Third, the White majority
must form a voting block that consistently defeats the minority's
preferred candidate. 35 Thus, the Court placed emphasis on statisti-
cal factors to establish the existence of vote dilution.36 These
31 Id. at 34-35.
32 Id. at 48-51.
31 Id. at 50. Because single-member districts are the smallest political unit,
they provide an accurate measure of the minority electoral potential. Id. at 50
n. 17. Also, single-member districts provide minorities with an opportunity to
elect representatives that does not exist when the minority population is
outnumbered by the majority. To determine what would constitute a sufficiently
large minority population in a district, a court examines a number of factors,
including how large the minority must be to elect the chosen candidate. United
Jewish Org. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 160 (1977). The general rule is that
minorities must comprise 65% of the district to have an effective opportunity to
elect a candidate. Id. at 164; Ketchum v. Byrne, 740 F.2d. 1398, 1415 (7th Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1135 (1985). The figure is comprised of 50% to
gain a numerical majority, and 5% extra for each of the following: lower number
of eligible minority voters, lower minority voter registration and lower minority
turnout. 1d; see J. Morgan Kousser, Beyond Gingles: Influence Districts and the
Pragmatic Tradition in Voting Rights Law, 27 U.S.F. L. REv. 551, 586 (1993)
(arguing that there is no precise point in which a minority group is guaranteed
an election).
34 Gingles, 478 U.S. at 51. For a minority population to prove cohesiveness,
it must prove that members of the minority group have common political beliefs.
"[M]embers of geographically insular racial and ethnic groups frequently share
socioeconomic characteristics, such as income level, employment status, amount
of education, housing and other living conditions, religion, language, and so
forth." Id. at 64.
3 1d. at 51.
36 "The essence of a § 2 claim is that a certain electoral law, practice, or
structure interacts with social and historic conditions to cause an inequality
enjoyed by Black and White voters to elect their preferred representatives." Id.
at 47. This test measures voter behavior and the electoral practice and does not
require discriminatory acts to establish a dilution claim. Id at 73. However,
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, in her concurrence, claims that this test creates a
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factors included the character of a minority population, degree of
racial polarization and voting patterns and behavior.37 The Court
relegated the results test to being a fourth factor used to assess
whether the dilutive districting scheme occurred in the context of
historical or continuing discrimination.3"
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor's concurrence 39 recognized that
the Court misconstrued the results test and disregarded congres-
sional intent by creating a test that would entitle minorities to
proportional representation if the plaintiffs could satisfy the three
preconditions. 40 The Court made electoral success the linchpin of
a dilution claim, with a review of the totality of circumstances
merely supporting a determination that a minority lacks the
opportunity to participate in the political system.4' In contrast,
Justice O'Connor stated that the Court should focus on the factors
in the congressional record, which demonstrate that the minority
has less opportunity to elect representatives, rather than on the
ability of the minority to elect representatives.42
When determining if a minority's electoral strength is diluted,
a court must have an idea of the minority's electoral strength in the
absence of the dilutive scheme.43 A minority population's electoral
opportunity is determined by calculating the difference between the
undiluted voting strength of the minority voting-age population and
the alleged dilutive system at issue. 44 The first Gingles condition
, right of proportional representation for all minority groups that can satisfy the
Gingles criteria. Id. at 85 (O'Connor, J.,.concurring).
" See Bernard Grofman, Expert Witness Testimony and the Evolution of
Voting Rights Case Law, in CONTROVERSIES IN MINORITY VOTING: THE VOTING
RIGHTS AcT IN PERSPECTIVE 225-27 (Bernard Grofman & Chandler Davidson
eds., 1992) (explaining the differences between the amorphous totality of the
circumstances test and the social science-based Gingles test.)
" Gingles, 478 U.S. at 48.
'9 Justice O'Connor's concurrence was joined by Chief Justice Warren
Burger, and Justices William Rehnquist and Lewis Powell.
40 Gingles, 478 U.S. at 85 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
41 Id. at 93 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
42 Id. at 99-100 (O'Connor, J., concurring); see supra note 28 and
accompanying text.
4' Gingles, 478 U.S. at 88 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
44 Id. at 88-89 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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implies that the Court's measure of undiluted voting strength is the
single-member district.45 When a districting plan is found to dilute
minority voting strength, a court directs the legislature of the state
or political subdivision to enact a plan that satisfies the require-
ments of the Voting Rights Act, usually single-member, majority-
minority districts. If the legislature is dilatory, a court may impose
single-member districts, 46 ensuring that the minority elects a
candidate of its choice.47
Even single-member districts are not immune from vote dilution
claims under the Voting Rights Act. Similar to claims against
multi-member districts, a plaintiff challenging a single-member
districting scheme must also satisfy the Gingles conditions.48
Minority voting strength in single-member districts is diluted by
redrawing the district lines either to fragment the minority over
41 Id at 50. "The Court's definition of the elements of a vote dilution claim
is simple and invariable: a court should calculate minority voting strength by
assuming that the minority group is concentrated in a single-member district in
which it constitutes a voting majority." Id. at 90 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
46 A federal court will not impose a districting scheme unless the state
judiciary or legislature fails timely to do so. Growe v. Emison, 113 S. Ct. 1075,
1081 (1993) (quoting Chapman v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1, 27 (1975)).
4 A majority-minority district is an electoral district where a protected
minority has a majority of the voters in a district to ensure the representation of
the preferred candidate of the minority. Single-member districts are the desired
voting scheme because the single-member district represents the undiluted votes
of a minority group to elect its preferred candidate. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 88
(O'Connor, J., concurring). "The single-member district is generally the
appropriate standard against which to measure minority group potential to elect."
Id. at 51 n.17. But see Holder v. Hall, 114 S. Ct. 2581, 2599 (1994) (Thomas,
J., concurring) ("[T]here is no principle inherent in our constitutional system, or
even in the history of the Nation's electoral practices, that makes single-member
districts the 'proper' mechanism for electing representatives to governmental
bodies."); LAM GUINIER, THE TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY 13-16 (1994)
(maintaining that single-member districts only transfer the inequities of the
majority-take-all from the popular level to the representative level, where the
minority interests are still subjugated by the majority interests); see infra note
177.
48 Growe, 113 S. Ct. at 1084.
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many districts or to pack a minority population into relatively few
districts.49
Any districting scheme must be narrowly tailored to further a
compelling state interest, because a state or political subdivision
must comply with section 2 of the Voting Rights Act that requires
determinations based on race. 0 The state has a compelling interest
to create racially based districts to avoid violating the Voting
Rights Act;5" however, the redistricting must not go beyond what
41 Voinovich v. Quilter, 113 S. Ct. 1149, 1156 (1993). Fragmentation occurs
when the minority is dispersed into a number of districts so that the minority is
not a majority in any district, making it unlikely that it will elect a candidate of
its choice. Id. at 1155. Packing occurs when a minority is concentrated into a
few districts so that the minority will comprise an excessive majority in these
districts. Id.
"O Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2832 (1993); Johnson v. Miller, 864 F.
Supp. 1354 (S.D. Ga. 1994); Vera v. Richards, 861 F. Supp. 1304, 1342 (S.D.
Tex. 1994); Shaw v. Hunt, 861 F. Supp. 408, 417 (E.D.N.C. 1994); Hays v.
Louisiana, 862 F. Supp. 119, 122 (W.D. La. 1994); see City of Richmond v. J.A.
Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S.
267, 277-78 (1986). The guidelines for Department of Justice preclearance
requirements for districts under § 5 demonstrate the overt racial considerations
taken into consideration when determining if a districting scheme violates the
Voting Rights Act:
(1) The extent to which minorities have been denied an equal
opportunity to participate meaningfully in the political process in the
jurisdiction.
(2) The extent to which minorities have been denied an equal
opportunity to influence elections and the decision making of elected
officials in the jurisdiction.
(3) The extent to which voting in the jurisdiction is racially polarized
and political activities are racially segregated.
(4) The extent to which the voter registration and election participation
of minority voters have been adversely effected by present and past
discrimination.
Miller, 864 F. Supp. at 1359 (quoting 28 C.F.R. § 51.58 (1994)). Shaw v. Reno
held that any race-based legislation must satisfy strict scrutiny. Any legislation
that "rationally cannot be understood as anything other than an effort to separate
voters into different districts on the basis of race, and ... lacks sufficient
justification" is invalid under the Equal Protection Clause. 113 S. Ct. at 2828.
"' Shaw v. Hunt, 861 F. Supp. at 436-42; cf Miller, 864 F. Supp. at 1380
(The Voting Rights Act "formalizes, codifies and universally imposes a
'compelling state interest' to redress historically persistent discriminatory voting
507
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is required to remedy the potential violation." This tailoring has
two inquiries: "(1) whether the current plan contains more majority
black districts than reasonably necessary to comply with the
[Voting Rights Act], and (2) whether the existing majority black
districts contain larger concentrations of minority voters than
reasonably necessary to give those voters a realistic opportunity to
elect candidates of their choice. 53 In addition, narrow tailoring
requires that districts are compact, contiguous and "exhibit respect
for neighborhoods, communities, and political subdivision lines.5
54
These principles do not alter the analysis to determine whether
minority vote dilution exists; instead, they limit a political
subdivision's flexibility to design a district which assists the racial
minority's opportunity to elect candidates. Therefore, to create valid
practices."). But see Hays, 862 F. Supp. at 123-24 (holding that the Voting
Rights Act, incumbency politics, past discrimination, or present socio-economic
effects of discrimination do not justify creating racially segregated voting
districts). Both courts have assumed that the 1982 amendments to § 2 are
constitutional because this section has been continuously interpreted as such by
the Supreme Court. Hunt, 861 F. Supp. at 438, n.24; see Holder, 114 S. Ct. at
2625-30 (Stevens, J., separate opinion responding to Justice Thomas' dissent)
(claiming that Congress adopted the Court's pre-1982 decisions in the amend-
ments of 1982 (with the exception of Bolden), thus, the weight of stare decisis
of the pre- and post-amendment decisions validates the interpretation of dilution
claims by the Court).
52 Miller, 864 F. Supp. at 1381 (finding that the Voting Rights Act is not a
license to engage in racial gerrymandering); see also Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct.
at 2830 (distinguishing between "what the law permits, and what it requires").
13 Miller, 864 F. Supp. at 1383. But cf Shaw v. Hunt, 861 F. Supp. at 445.
The Hunt court held that a court must look to five factors to determine if a plan
is narrowly tailored:
(i) the efficacy of alternative remedies; (ii) whether the program
imposes a rigid racial 'quota' or just a flexible racial 'goal'; (iii) the
planned duration of the program; (iv) the relationship between the
program's goal for minority representation in the pool of individuals
ultimately selected to receive the benefit in question and the percentage
of minorities in the relevant pool of eligible candidates; and (v) the
impact of programs on the rights of innocent third parties.
Id.
54 Vera, 861 F. Supp. at 1310. Contra Shaw v. Hunt, 861 F. Supp. at 449
(finding that "[c]ompactness, contiguity, and respect for political subdivisions...
are not constitutional imperatives").
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districts, a state or political subdivision must walk the tightrope
between falling afoul of the directive of the Voting Rights Act and
the limitations set by the Equal Protection Clause. In Johnson v De
Grandy," the Court finds itself walking this tightrope and uncom-
fortably decides that the creation of single-member, majority-
minority districts that are proportional to the minority population
is the maximum requirement of remedial districting under the
Voting Rights Act.
II. BACKGROUND OF JOHNSON V. DE GRANDY
56
A. Facts of the Case
Hispanic voters, including Miguel De Grandy, brought this
action claiming that Florida's reapportionment plan for the State
Senate and House of Representatives violated section 2 of the
Voting Rights Act.17 This action involved Dade County, in which
there are twenty single-member House districts" and seven single-
member Senate districts.59 The voting-age population of the House
district was 46.6% Hispanic, 15.6% African American and 36.4%
Anglo.6' The voting-age population of the Senate districts was
44.8% Hispanic, 15.8% African American and 39.4% Anglo.
6'
The new redistricting plan provided for nine House districts62 and
" 114 S. Ct. 2647 (1994).
16 Id. For an excellent background of the De Grandy case in the context of
the history of redistricting legislation and litigation in Florida, see generally
George L. Waas, The Process and Politics of Legislative Reapportionment and
Redistricting Under the Florida Constitution, 18 NOVA L. REv. 1001 (1994).
17 42 U.S.C. § 1973. The State Conference of the National Association for
the Advancement of Colored People filed a similar suit, which was resolved
separately. Johnson v. De Grandy, 114 S. Ct. at 2651-52; see De Grandy v.
Wetherell, 794 F. Supp. 1076 (N.D. Fla. 1992).
"' De Grandy, 114 S. Ct. at 2654.
'9 Id. at 2663.
60 Appellant's Brief at 7 n.10, De Grandy (No. 92-519).
61 De Grandy, 114 S. Ct. at 2663.
62 Nine districts comprise 45% of districts in that area. Appellant's Brief at
7 n. 10, De Grandy (No. 92-519). Four African American and seven Anglo House
districts were created, constituting 20% and 35% of the area, respectively. Id.
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three Senate districts;63 in all of these districts, Hispanics would
have a voting-age population sufficient to elect candidates of their
choice. 64 Nonetheless, the plaintiffs claimed that the new plan
diluted Hispanic voting strength because eleven House districts and
four Senate districts could have been created if the legislature had
not packed, fractured and otherwise submerged the Hispanic voting-
age population to protect White incumbents.65
The district court found a violation of section 2 because the De
Grandy plaintiffs satisfied the three Gingles factors and continued
to suffer from the effects of discrimination.66 First, the Hispanic
population was sufficiently large and geographically compact to
comprise eleven House and four Senate majority-minority dis-
tricts. 67 The court found that the sixty-five percent guideline for
minority composition of the districts was suitable because of the
high concentration of recent immigrants and lower voter registra-
tion numbers.68 Second, the Hispanic minority was politically
cohesive. 69 Third, the non-Hispanics voted sufficiently as a block
to defeat Hispanic candidates.7" The division of Dade County into
three distinct ethnic communities, Hispanic, African American and
Anglo, has led to the development of a political process in which
ethnic factors predominate.7 Because the Hispanic and African
63 One African American and three Anglo districts were created, constituting
14.3% and 42.9% of the district area, respectively. De Grandy, 114 S. Ct. at
2663.
' De Grandy v. Wetherell, 815 F. Supp. 1550, 1567 (N.D. Fla. 1992), aff'd
in part and rev'd in part sub noma. Johnson v. De Grandy, 114 S. Ct. 2647
(1994).
65 Wetherell, 815 F. Supp. at 1559.
66 Id. at 1563.
67 Id. at 1568.
68 Id. at 1564-67; see supra note 33.
69 Wetherell, 815 F. Supp. at 1571. Even though there might be differences
among the several subgroups of the Hispanic population-Cuban, Nicaraguan,
Honduran, Guatemalan, Puerto Rican and Dominican-the court found that these
groups have many of the same views and tend to vote similarly. Id.
70 Id. at 1572.
71 Id. According to Dr. Moreno, an expert on racial voting practices in
Miami who is recognized by the district court, there are four combinations of
racially polarized voting in Miami:
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American populations are not politically cohesive, the court did not
address the importance of cross-ethnic voting coalitions;72 instead,
the court stressed the importance of racial considerations in Dade
County politics. Finally, the court recognized the existence of
discrimination against Hispanics, including English-only initiatives,
which outweighed the significant gains that members of the
Hispanic community had made in their political representation.
The district court held that the additional Senate district
requested by the plaintiffs could not be constructed without
adversely affecting and submerging African American voting
strength.73 On the other hand, the court held that two additional
House districts could be constructed to give Hispanics a super-
majority without adversely affecting African American districts.7
Therefore, the court required the De Grandy plaintiff's plan to
create eleven House districts.
B. The Supreme Court Decision: Justice David Souter '
Majority Opinion
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the district court's judg-
ment,75 holding that there is no violation of section 2 of the
First, [there] are races featuring a Hispanic candidate versus a White
candidate with Black[s] supporting the White candidate; Second, a
Black candidate versus a White candidate with Hispanic voters
supporting the White candidate; third, a Black candidate versus a
Hispanic candidate with White voters holding the balance of power,
and finally the[re] are races between two candidates of the same ethnic
group in which voters from the other two group[s] support the least
ethnic of the two candidates.
Id. (quoting Moreno Aff. at 21).
72 For a coalition of racial minorities to establish a § 2 violation, the
coalition must establish the Gingles factors. For example, two minority groups
must demonstrate politically cohesive behavior. See Campos v. City of Baytown,
840 F.2d 1240 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 492 U.S. 905 (1989); League of United
Latin Am. Citizens v. Midland Ind. Sch. Dist., 812 F.2d 1494 (5th Cir.), vacated
and rev'd on other grounds, 829 F.2d 546 (5th Cir. 1987).
" De Grandy v. Wetherell, 815 F. Supp. at 1574-80.
74 Id. at 1582.
7' Because the plaintiffs brought their Voting Rights Act case in federal
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Voting Rights Act where the minority voting-age population has a
proportional share of majority-minority districts and an equal
opportunity to participate in the political process.76 The Court
reevaluated the totality of the circumstances test to determine the
existence of a section 2 violation. In particular, the Court examined
the importance of proportionality77 within the totality of the
circumstances. By shifting the focus from demographic patterns and
electoral failure that demonstrates a lack of minority electoral
strength to discriminatory practices that have a dilutive effect on
minority voting opportunity, the Court made it difficult for a
claimant to prevail on a section 2 claim.
The totality of the circumstances test has a different impact on
dilution claims of single-member districts than on multi-member
districts. Challenges against single-member districts under section
2 of the Voting Rights Act require the same threshold conditions
as a dilution claim against multi-member districts;78 however,
single-member districts have a harder time proving a lack of
electoral opportunity because "judgments about inequality may
district court, the appeal was heard by a panel of three judges pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2284 (1988). Any party may appeal a decision by a three-judge court
directly to the U.S. Supreme Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1988).
76 The two questions that the Court asks are whether all three Gingles factors
are satisfied, and whether the totality of the circumstances demonstrates that
Hispanics are able to elect the candidates of their choice in proportion to their
number in the general population. Johnson v. De Grandy, 114 S. Ct. 2647, 2655
(1994).
" The Court defines proportionality as "link[ing] the number of majority-
minority voting districts to minority members' share of the relevant population."
Id. at 2658 n. 11. This definition is not to be confused with the limitation in 42
U.S.C. § 1973(b), which states, "Provided, That nothing in this section
establishes a right to have members of a protected class elected in numbers equal
to their proportion in the population." The difference is that the creation of
majority-minority districts only gives minorities the opportunity to create districts
in which they may elect a member of their choice, not secure a seat for a
member of the protected class. For example, a majority-minority district may
elect a member of the majority who best represents the minority's interests,
rather than a member of the minority.
71 De Grandy, 114 S. Ct. at 2654-55; see also Voinovich v. Quilter, 113 S.
Ct. 1149, 1156-57 (1993); Growe v. Emison, 113 S. Ct. 1075, 1084 (1993).
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become closer calls."79 In single-member districts, the issue is
whether the districts could have been delineated in a way that
would give a minority group additional districts."0 "Plaintiffs
challenging single-member districts may claim, not total submer-
gence, but partial submergence; not the chance for some electoral
success in place of none, but the chance for more success in place
of some."'', In applying this standard to De Grandy, the Court
asks
whether a history of persistent discrimination reflected in
the larger society and its bloc voting behavior portended
any dilutive effect from a newly proposed districting
scheme, whose pertinent features were majority-minority
districts in substantial proportion to the minority's share of
voting-age population [and] ... whether the totality of
facts, including those pointing to proportionality, showed
that the new scheme would deny minority voters equal
political opportunity.8 2
The first part of this question reiterates the Gingles conditions and
the discriminatory effects, but the second part of the question asks
whether the minority has an equal opportunity "in spite of these
facts."
8 3
The Court equates proportionality of effective majority-minority
voting districts 4 with equal political opportunity under the Voting




13 Id. In Baird v. Consolidated City of Indianapolis, a dilution claim against
a city-county council comprised of single-member districts and a multi-member
district was dismissed because "other considerations [demonstrated] that the
minority ha[d] an undiminished right to participate in the political process." De
Grandy, 114 S. Ct. at 2657 n.10 (quoting Baird v. Consolidated City of
Indianapolis, 976 F.2d 357, 359 (7th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2334
(1993)); see infra notes 113-17 and accompanying text.
14 An effective voting district is a district in which the minority has a fair
opportunity to elect the candidate of its choice. See, e.g., White v. Regester, 412
U.S. 755, 765 (1973) (finding that the political processes were not equally open
to the minority population).
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Rights Act." Because Hispanics possess a percentage of the
districts roughly equal to their percentage of the total population in
Dade County, there is no dilution claim because this proportionality
encourages Hispanic participation in the electoral process.8 6
Similarly, proportionality would vitiate any fragmentation or
packing claims unless the minority districts were drawn inconsis-
tently with the regular practices of drawing districts.87 However,
section 2 does not require maximization of the number of Hispanic
majority-minority districts.88 The Court noted that if the number
of Hispanic districts is maximized to the greatest possible number
of districts, it is possible to provide the minority population with
political participation seventy-five percent above its numerical
strength. 9 The Court provided the following hypothetical:
Assume a hypothetical jurisdiction of 1,000 voters divided
into 10 districts of 100 each, where members of a minority
group make up 40 percent of the voting population and
voting is totally polarized along racial lines. With the right
geographical dispersion to satisfy the compactness require-
ment, and with careful manipulation of district lines, the
minority voters might be placed in control of as many as
7 of the 10 districts. Each such district could be drawn
with at least 51 members of the minority group, and
whether the remaining minority voters were added to the
groupings of 51 for safety or scattered in the other three
districts, minority voters would be able to elect candidates
of their choice in all seven districts.90
85 42 U.S.C. § 1973.
86 De Grandy, 114 S. Ct. at 2658.
17 Id at 2659. If the minority voting-age population had districts propor-
tional to its population, then the Court's holding in De Grandy would not require
additional minority districts even if there were purposeful fragmentation or
packing in drawing the district lines.
88 Id. at 2659-60.
89 Id. at 2660.
90 Id. at 2659. The brief for the appellant provides two other hypotheticals:
[I]n a hypothetical 10-district jurisdiction with 100 voters per district
(1,000 total voters), a group constituting only 50% of the population
(500 voters) could control up to 9 of the 10 districts, so long as their
geographic dispersion was such that 9 districts could be drawn each
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According to Justice Souter, this situation is "absurd" and against
the "textually stated purpose" of the Voting Rights Act.91 "One
may suspect vote dilution from political famine, but one is not
entitled to suspect (much less infer) dilution from mere failure to
guarantee a political feast., 92 In other words, rough proportionality
indicates the lack of a dilutive electoral scheme.
Even though proportionality provides strong evidence of a fair
districting scheme, it is not dispositive. Other factors may outweigh
proportionality to deny minority voters an equal electoral opportu-
nity. For example, a state may use racially drawn, majority-
minority districts to isolate a minority group that has successfully
established coalitions with other groups to elect candidates. Because
other recognized voting impediments could be used in conjunction
with proportional single-member districts, 93 proportionality alone
is not the touchstone of dilution claims. In spite of the majority's
focus on constructing proportional districting plans, the Court
recognized that the goal of the Voting Rights Act is to reduce the
reliance of race-conscious remedies.94 The Court stated:
If the lesson of Gingles is that society's racial and ethnic
cleavages sometimes necessitate majority-minority districts
to ensure equal political and electoral opportunity, that
should not obscure the fact that there are communities in
which minority citizens are able to form coalitions with
containing 51 members of the group (9 x 51 = 459). Similarly,
depending on how district lines are drawn, a group constituting only
3 8[%] of the population could control three of five legislative districts
even when the minority group must have at least a 60% majority in a
district to ensure election of a candidate of choice.
Appellant's Brief at 25, De Grandy (No. 92-519).
9' De Grandy, 114 S. Ct. at 2659-60.
92 Id.
9' The Court recognized that even the most blatant discriminatory practices
may occur with proportional districting. These practices include: "ballot box
stuffing, outright violence, discretionary registration, property requirements, the
poll tax, and the white primary." Id. In addition, "the most blatant racial
gerrymandering in half of a county's single member districts would be irrelevant
under § 2 if offset by political gerrymandering in the other half, so long as
proportionality [is] the bottom line." Id. at 2661.
94 Id. at 2661.
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voters from other racial and ethnic groups, having no need
to be a majority within a single district in order to elect
candidates of their choice. Those candidates may not
represent perfection to every minority voter, but minority
voters are not immune from the obligation to pull, haul,
and trade to find common political ground, the virtue of
which is not to be slighted in applying a statute meant to
hasten the waning of racism in American politics.9"
The majority relegated the importance of disproportionality to a
footnote.96 Similar to proportionality, the effects of the extent of
the disproportionality must be weighed with other factors to
determine if the districting scheme would deny the minority equal
political opportunity.97
C. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor ' Concurrence
Justice O'Connor focused on the limited impact of proportion-
ality in the totality of the circumstances review in all dilution
claims, notwithstanding whether the districts demonstrate or lack
proportionality.98  She implicitly acknowledged the Court's
acceptance of her interpretation of dilution claims under section 2
of the Voting Rights Act.99 Her argument in De Grandy was that
"[f]ack of proportionality can never by itself prove dilution, for
courts must always carefully and searchingly review the totality of
the circumstances, including the extent to which minority groups
have access to the political process."' 00 This position is directly
reminiscent of her proposed test in Gingles. In Gingles, Justice
O'Connor stated that a court must not only analyze the chance that
the preferred minority candidate will be elected, but must also
consider the extent of the minority group's access to the political
95 Id.
96 See id at 2661 n.17.
97 Id.
9' Id. at 2664 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
99 See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 104-05 (1986) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring); see supra notes 37-41 and accompanying text.
100 De Grandy, 114 S. Ct. at 2664 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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process.' ° 1 Justice O'Connor recognized that the majority's
opinion was an affirmation of her test that combined the Gingles
conditions and the effects of the totality of the circumstances on
minority electoral opportunity, rather than requiring the maximum
number of minority-majority districts.'02
D. Justice Anthony Kennedy Concurrence
Under a section 2 analysis, Justice Kennedy agrees with the
majority opinion that section 2 does not require maximization;
however, he finds that "placing undue emphasis upon proportion-
ality risks defeating the goals underlying the Voting Rights Act of
1965, as amended."' °3 Purposely creating racially-based, propor-
tional majority-minority districts "tend[s] to entrench the very
practices and stereotypes the Equal Protection Clause is set
against. '  Because the constitutionality of section 2 was not
challenged, Justice Kennedy could not evaluate these implications,
but he maintains that redistricting plans which are racially based
must comply with both the Voting Rights Act and strict scrutiny
under the Equal Protection Clause.0 5
E. Justice Clarence Thomas' Dissent, Joined by Justice
Antonin Scalia
The dissent found that apportionment plans are not a justiciable
"standard, practice, or procedure" under section 2 of the Voting
'0' Gingles, 478 U.S. at 105 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
.02 In making proportionality relevant and not dispositive, Justice O'Connor's
claim that § 2 does not require maximization may be interpreted to mean that § 2
does not even require proportionality where the totality of the circumstances
proves otherwise. De Grandy, 114 S. Ct. at 2664. Therefore, Justice O'Connor
is in agreement with the majority, even though the majority supported a
districting scheme in which proportionality remains the standard.
'03 Id. at 2665 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Id4 d. at 2666 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
105 Id. at 2667 (Kennedy, J., concurring); see Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S.
380, 418 (1991) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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Rights Act. 116 A justiciable standard, practice, or procedure only
includes those impediments that hinder a voter's ability to register
or cast a ballot, not whether the individual vote has meaning or
not. '7 The dissenters argue that the Court, in choosing to apply
majority-minority single-member districts when electing minority
representatives, is making a political decision which is better left
to Congress or state legislatures. 0 8 In addition, the Court is
condoning the practice of districting by race. By "creating racially
'safe boroughs' . . . [w]e have involved the federal courts, and
indeed the Nation, in the enterprise of systematically dividing the
country into electoral districts along racial lines-an enterprise of
segregating the races into political homelands that amounts in truth
to nothing short of a system of 'political apartheid."" 0 9
Furthermore, the dissent claims that the present method of
determining the validity of section 2 claims is unworkable. Even
106 De Grandy, 114 S. Ct. at 2667 (Thomas, J., dissenting); Holder v. Hall,
114 S. Ct. 2581, 2591 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring). In his dissent in De
Grandy, Justice Thomas refers to his concurring opinion in Holder for the
explanation as to why an apportionment plan is not a "standard, practice, or
procedure" justiciable under § 2. De Grandy, 114 S. Ct. at 2667 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
107 Holder, 114 S. Ct. at 2605 (Thomas, J. concurring).
"o Id. at 2614 (Thomas, J., concurring)
We would be mighty Platonic guardians indeed if Congress had
granted us the authority to determine the best form of local government
for every county, city, village, and town in America. But under our
constitutional system, this Court is not a centralized politburo
appointed for life to dictate to the provinces the 'correct' theories of
democratic representation, the 'best' electoral systems for securing
truly 'representative' government, the 'fairest' proportions of minority
political influence.
Id. at 2602 (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Thomas criticizes the fact that a
judge is only limited by his 'political imagination' when creating a remedy for
a dilution claim. Id. at 2601 (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting Lani Guinier, The
Representation of Minority Interests: The Question of Single Member Districts,
14 CARDOZO L. REv. 1135, 1137 (1993)).
109 Holder, 114 S. Ct. at 2598 (Thomas, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
In fact, any district that is created to give a minority an opportunity to elect a
candidate of its choice is blatant racial gerrymandering. Id. at 2618 (Thomas, J.,
concurring).
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though the Court recites the Gingles factors and the totality of the
circumstances test, the Court inevitably uses racial proportionality
as a guide to determine dilution.110
III. ANALYSIS
The Court's decision in Johnson v De Grandy is a dramatic
change in philosophy from that of Thornburg v Gingles. Gingles
held that every protected minority group that was numerous,
compact, cohesive and consistently outvoted as a result of historic
discrimination, could establish a section 2 claim and be entitled to
single-member districts. This test emphasized the minority's ability
to elect candidates in proportion to their number in the population.
De Grandy honored Congress' original intent by investigating
whether the minority has an opportunity to elect candidates despite
past discrimination. De Grandy, however, makes vote dilution
claims more difficult for plaintiffs to prove because it requires both
the Gingles factors and the results test. Not only must a claimant
show numerosity, compactness, cohesiveness and circumstances
which may lead to an inference of vote dilution, but now a
claimant must show how the discriminatory factors and effects have
a dilutive effect on political opportunity in contrast to the advances
that the minority population has made.'
This Comment surveys how the De Grandy rationale is applied
in both single-member districts and multi-member or at-large
districts. In a challenge to single-member districts, the evidence of
... Id. at 2616-17 (Thomas, J., concurring). According to Justice Thomas, the
Gingles test solely determines if minorities can be placed in minority districts
and runs counter to the express reservation against proportionality in 42 U.S.C.
§ 1973(b). See supra note 77 and accompanying text. The Gingles factors "are
nothing but puffery used to fill out an impressive verbal formulation and to
create the impression that the outcome in a vote dilution case rests upon a variety
of relevant circumstances." Holder, 114 S. Ct. at 2616 (Thomas, J., concurring).
"Few words would be too strong to describe the dissembling that pervades the
application of the totality of circumstances test under our interpretation of § 2.
It is an empty incantation-a mere conjurer's trick that serves to hide the drive
for proportionality that animates our decisions." Id. at 2618 (Thomas, J.,
concurring).
". Johnson v. De Grandy, 114 S. Ct. 2647, 2658 (1994).
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rough proportionality of the number of districts to the minority
population, combined with the achievements of the minority
population, has made establishing a section 2 claim difficult. On the
other hand, in challenges to multi-member or at-large districts,
courts are following Gingles and emphasizing the complete lack of
electoral success. However, despite the Court's move from a racial
group's proportionality toward each individual's political opportu-
nity through cross-racial coalitions, the Court did not establish
standards for determining vote dilution in the absence of racial
proportionality. 1 2 Thus, in future cases, courts will continue
either to follow Gingles and objectively rely on the degree of racial
polarization and electoral success, or weigh the effects of discrimi-
nation subjectively. This substantial reliance on proportionality of
majority-minority districts to minority voting-age population is
misplaced because it limits the potential of minorities to exercise
electoral power in other types of districting schemes and promotes
a purpose contrary to the Voting Rights Act and the U.S.
Constitution.
A. De Grandy and Section 2 Challenges to Single-Member
Districts
Dilution challenges to single-member districts concern the
"reasonableness of drawing a series of district lines in one
combination rather than another .... ."'3 A court must do a
comprehensive analysis of the totality of the circumstances to
determine whether the effects of discrimination and the districting
scheme deny the minority an opportunity to effectively participate
in the political process.11 4 The main query is whether minorities
have equal political opportunity in spite of racial polarization and
a history of discrimination. After De Grandy, the only method of
proving a section 2 claim is to establish a nexus between discrimi-
natory practices or effects and its subsequent impact on minority
112 See Holder, 114 S. Ct. at 2617 n.30 (Thomas, J., concurring)
("[M]easuring political effectivenessby any method other than counting numbers
of seats can rapidly become a wholly unmanageable task.").
13 De Grandy, 114 S. Ct. at 2658.
114 Id.
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voting opportunity. If a minority group is fragmented"' to the
extent that the group members will never be able to elect a
candidate of their choice and if the minority group is suffering
from the effects of historical and present discrimination, there will
be a De Grandy violation.
The nexus between the electoral system and the discrimination
leads to the conclusion that the discrimination deprives the minority
group of electoral opportunity. However, when some majority-
minority districts exist, the issue changes from the "chance for
some electoral success in place of none [to] the chance for more
success in place of some."' 1 6 In this scenario, the relationship
between discriminatory effects and voting patterns becomes more
tenuous; a dilution claim can only be established if the plaintiff can
prove that packing or fragmentation was the result of discrimina-
tion. Moreover, if the minority has achieved a proportional number
of majority-minority districts, a dilution claim is impossible to
establish, unless overt discriminatory practices exist. Even though
the Court maintained that proportionality will not create a "safe
harbor" for states, the Court based its decision on proportionality
and has not announced a different standard to determine whether
equal political opportunity exists."
7
Unless a nexus between the discrimination and voting opportu-
nity is established, a plaintiff's presentation of substantial proof of
historical and present discrimination will not be sufficient to prevail
on a claim under section 2. In Sanchez v Colorado,"' the plain-
tiffs challenged the delineation of District 60 of the Colorado
House of Representatives as unlawfully diluting the Hispanic
vote."9 The district court balanced a litany of past and present
"' See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
116 De Grandy, 114 S. Ct. at 2658.
117 id.
11' 861 F. Supp. 1516 (D. Colo. 1994). The court disposed of the case by
finding that the plaintiffs did not satisfy the numerosity and compactness
elements of the Gingles test; nevertheless, the district court completed the entire
analysis even though it was not required.
" Id. The district in question consisted of a 42.38% voting-age, Hispanic
population. Id. at 1519. The plaintiffs asked for a district that would consist of
a 50.03% voting-age, Hispanic population. Id. at 1522.
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discrimination against the present realities of Hispanic opportunity
and held that there is no connection between this discrimination and
the minority's opportunity to participate in the political proc-
ess.120 In addition, the court emphasized the totality of the
circumstances over the Gingles factors.'
Similarly, in Straw v Barbour County,122 plaintiffs challenged
a proposed districting plain that established three majority-minority
districts and one additional influence district.22 The plaintiffs
claimed that an alternate plan should have been adopted so that the
influence district would contain 48.57% African Americans rather
than the 37.76% in the challenged plan. 24 Without addressing the
existence of proportionality, the district court held that the plaintiffs
must use "sophisticated statistical and historical evidence" within
the totality of the circumstances to substantiate a section 2
claim. 25 Because the plaintiffs did not present any evidence of
lack of electoral opportunity, their claim failed.
12 6
120 The list of discriminatory incidents is exhaustive and would have been
sufficient to satisfy a dilution claim pre-De Grandy. The Hispanic population in
South Central Colorado has suffered a history of social, economic and political
effects of discrimination, an official discriminatory act by the county clerk 18
years ago, an English-Only Amendment in 1988 which was defeated in a
referendum, the loss of Hispanic voter registrations in 1986, lower education
levels, higher unemployment and allegations of racial comments in elections.
Sanchez v. Colorado, 861 F. Supp. 1516, 1529-30 (D. Colo. 1994). These
discriminatory incidents were balanced by the fact that Hispanics today have
equal access to jobs, education and loans, and the fact that Hispanics have
representatives in many public offices in Colorado. Id.
21 "The court must be careful not to overemphasize the relative importance
of the three Gingles factors and of historical discrimination, when measured
against evidence tending to show that in spite of the facts, minority voters have
an equal measure of political and electoral opportunity." Sanchez, 861 F. Supp.
at 1521 (quoting Johnson v. De Grandy, 114 S. Ct. 2647, 2658 (1994)).
122 864 F. Supp. 1148 (M.D. Ala. 1994).
123 Id. at 1150-53. The county's racial composition is 55.55% White and
44.04% Black. Id at 1150. An influence district is a district in which the
minority does not constitute a majority, but is large enough to elect its candidate
of choice if the candidate could attract enough cross-over votes from the
majority. Voinovich v. Quilter, 113 S. Ct. 1149, 1155 (1993).
124 Straw v. Barbour County, 864 F. Supp. 1148, 1153 (M.D. Ala. 1994).
125 Id. at 1154.
126 Id.
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However, when proportionality is used as a defense to section
2, it dominates the analysis of the totality of the circumstances. In
NAACP v Austin,127 plaintiffs argued that the Michigan Supreme
Court's 1992 legislative apportionment plan 2 ' diluted African
American voting strength by concentrating African Americans in a
number of districts proportional-to their population. 29 The district
court applied De Grandy to determine that there was not a violation
of section 2 without considering the Gingles factors. 3 ' The
presence of rough proportionality was used as an affirmative
defense to the plaintiff's allegations. "Even if the plaintiffs prove
the existence of the Gingles preconditions, the defendants may be
able to defeat a section 2 claim by showing that the minority group
in question has achieved, or will achieve, substantially proportional
representation under the challenged districting plan."13' After
finding rough proportionality and noting an absence of "official
impediments to registration or voting," the court ended its in-
quiry.'32 The court found that historic official discrimination does
not affect a system which provides proportional electoral opportu-
nity.133 Because the Supreme Court did not specify a formula to
determine when a minority's electoral opportunity is diluted, these
lower courts had to balance the evidence of discriminatory practices
against proof of equal opportunity, which includes a heavy
emphasis on roughly proportional districting. This is a confusing
standard to resolve claims, and different courts will resolve similar
claims differently. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals admits
that it is not even sure what is required under a section 2 claim.
127 857 F. Supp. 560 (E.D. Mich. 1994) (per curiam).
'28 If the Michigan Legislature fails to pass a legislative reapportionment
plan after the census, the Michigan Supreme Court is required to develop a plan.
Id. at 563.
129 Id. at 566.
130 Id. at 571. "[Wle do not reach, nor need we reach in light of De Grandy,
the question of whether the plaintiffs have establishedthe Gingles preconditions."
Id.
131 Id. at 568.
132 Id. at 571.
'33 Id. "[T]he defendants' showing of persistent, proportional representation
is sufficient to defeat the plaintiffs' Section 2 claims, absent proof of a racially
discriminatory motivation in the drawing of the district lines." Id.
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"We wish we knew exactly what a plaintiff must prove in order to
prevail under the Voting Rights Act. Section 2(b) ... directs the
trier of fact to consider the 'totality of circumstances,' and the
judicial glosses on this vague phrase do not provide clear guid-
ance." '134 The U.S. Supreme Court must articulate a standard or
most dilution claims of single-member districts will fail.
B. De Grandy and Challenges to Other Districting Plans
The Supreme Court intended De Grandy to apply to multi-
member and at-large challenges to a lesser extent than challenges
to single-member districts. The basis for applying De Grandy to
single-member districts is that minorities in these districts have
some representation, and the only question is the extent of that
representation. 13 However, minorities may not have the opportu-
nity to elect any representatives in multi-member or at-large
districts. Most challenges to at-large or multi-member districting
plans are not hindered by the De Grandy decision. In Baird v
Consolidated City of Indianapolis, 136 for example, the minority
group's opportunity was not impeded by a multi-member electoral
scheme. Baird involved a twenty-nine-member city-county council,
of which twenty-five representatives were elected from single-
member districts and four representatives were elected from one
multi-member district. 137 Because the African American minority
controlled seven of the single-member districts and none of the
multi-member seats, members of the minority group challenged the
multi-member district as diluting minority voting strength.
138
Because the African American minority controlled 24.14% of the
total districts (28% of the single-member districts), while it
114 Barnett v. Daley, 32 F.3d 1196, 1201-02 (7th Cir.) (internal citations
omitted).
.35 Johnson v. De Grandy, 114 S. Ct. 2647, 2658.
136 976 F.2d 357 (7th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2334 (1993). The
Supreme Court used this case as an example of the effect of the totality of the
circumstances test on a multi-member district. De Grandy, 114 S. Ct. at 2657
n.10.
137 Baird v. Consolidated City of Indianapolis, 976 F.2d at 358.
138 Id.
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constituted only 21.28% of the total population, the Seventh Circuit
held that the totality of the circumstances, consisting of propor-
tionality and the political differences of African American and
White voters, failed to establish a dilution claim against the multi-
member district.'39 Thus, De Grandy also requires the court to
examine the totality of the circumstances and its effects on minority
political opportunity. Without the strong countervailing factor of
minority political representation, the effects of the districting plan
along with the other Gingles factors will be sufficient to establish
a violation of section 2.140
Cane v Worcester County14 1 was the first case after De
Grandy to challenge an at-large electoral system. 42 The Fourth
Circuit viewed De Grandy essentially as a restatement of
Gingles143 and considered the effects of racially polarized voting
and discriminatory practices in place over ninety years ago. It
determined that
under the totality of the circumstances, the current system
for election to the Worcester County Commission interacts
with past and present discrimination to deprive African
Americans of Worcester County the same "opportunity [as]
other members of the electorate to participate in the
political process and to elect representatives of their
choice.' 44
"9 Id. at 360-62; see Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 149-56 (1971);
League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Clements, 999 F.2d. 831, 858-61 (5th
Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 878 (1994) (finding no § 2 claim when the
electoral behavior is based on partisan politics and not race).
140 The determinative question is "whether a history of persistent discrimina-
tion reflected in the larger society and its bloc voting behavior portended any
dilutive effect from a [districting scheme, and this] scheme would deny minority
voters equal opportunity." De Grandy, 114 S. Ct. at 2658.
4' 35 F.3d 921 (4th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1097 (Feb. 21,
1995).
142 Cane involved the at-large election of five commissioners for the county
board. Id. at 923.
141 Id. at 925.
144 Id. at 926 (citing Cane v. Worcester County, 840 F. Supp. 1081, 1091
(D. Md.), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 35 F.3d 921 (4th Cir. 1994), cert.
denied, 115 S. Ct. 1097 (Feb. 21, 1995) (quoting 42 U.S.C.A. § 1973(b)). In
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Similarly, in Harvell v Blytheville School District #5,145 an
unsuccessful African American candidate challenged the at-large
method of electing members to the school board."4 The voting-
age population of the county is sixty-four percent White and thirty-
five percent African American. 147 The school board consisted of
eight members; two African American members were consistently
elected from 1975 to 1991.148 After considering the Gingles
conditions and the totality of circumstances, the circuit court
reversed the lower court's decision as clearly erroneous and held
that the at-large electoral scheme diluted minority votes. 149 The
Eighth Circuit heard a chronicle of potential discriminatory effects
and it emphasized those that supported the plaintiff's claim that the
minority's political opportunity was diminished. 0
making its determination, the district court found that the three Gingles
conditions were satisfied and the "totality of the circumstances" was sufficient
to establish a violation of § 2. Id. The totality of the circumstances finding was
based on Maryland's employment of voting prerequisites from 1870 to the early
1900s that discriminated against African Americans. Id Racial polarization was
the main emphasis in the determination of vote dilution. Cane, 840 F. Supp. at
1089-90. The plaintiff, Honiss Cane, Jr., claimed that racial polarization exists
because his businesses are predominately supported by African Americans and
the county has never elected an African American commissioner, even though the
African American population comprises 21% of the total population of the
county. Neal A. Lewis, Maryland County Embroiled in Voting Rights Suit, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 2, 1994, at B8. However, the defendant claimed that the minority
candidates expect special treatment to be elected and the present racial
polarization is the result of this voting rights lawsuit. Id
145 33 F.3d 910 (8th Cir. 1994), vacated, No. 93-1009EAJ, 1994 U.S. App.
LEXIS 32295 (8th Cir. Nov. 16, 1994).
146 Id. at 911.
147 Id.
148 Id
149 Id. at 917.
"So Id at 915-16. The litany of past discrimination was similar to Sanchez,
supra notes 118-121 and accompanying text, however, the court in this case
made the logical leap and held that these effects of past and present discrimina-
tion do have an impact on the voting opportunity of the minority population.
Harvell v. Blytheville Sch. Dist. #5, 33 F.3d at 916.
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However, in applying the totality of circumstances test to
judicial elections, 5 ' the state's interest in a fair and effective
judiciary will generally outweigh the minority's right to have an
equal opportunity to elect judges of its choice. In Nipper v
Smith, 152 the Eleventh Circuit rejected a challenge to the at-large
system to elect judges in Florida's Fourth Judicial Circuit and
Duval County court'53 because the defendants effectively rebutted
the plaintiff's dilution claim. Under De Grandy, courts must
examine all evidence of minority political opportunity before
concluding that, given the totality of the circumstances, the
minority group was not excluded from "meaningful access to the
political process due to the interaction of racial bias in the
community with the challenged voting scheme."' 54 Because the
factors involved in a judicial election are distinctive, the court gave
substantial weight to the nonracial factors, including the lower
court's finding that "justice in the Fourth Circuit and Duval County
courts is being administered fairly and impartially by judges who
are 'responsive to the needs of all citizens' and the importance of
maintaining an at-large system.155
' Judicial elections are justiciable under § 2 of the Voting Rights Act. See
Houston Lawyers' Ass'n v. Attorney Gen., 501 U.S. 419 (1991); Chisom v.
Roemer, 501 U.S. 380 (1991).
152 39 F.3d 1494 (1 1th Cir. 1994) (en banc).
113 Id at 1496.
154 Id. at 1524. The Eleventh Circuit maintains that bias remains an essential
part of a § 2 claim:
The existence of some form of racial discrimination therefore remains
the cornerstone of section 2 claims; to be actionable, a deprivation of
the minority group's right to equal participation in the political process
must be on account of a classification, decision, or practice that
depends on race or color, not on account of some other racially neutral
clause.
Id. at 1515.
' Id. at 1541 (citations omitted). Single-member districts would run counter
to a fair and efficient judicial system because impartial judges would be
accountable to their constituents in a sub-district to the detriment of another
person living in the greater district. Nipper, 39 F.3d at 1543. More importantly,
non-minority judges should be responsive to minority interests. Under a district-
ing plan that segregates people by race, a judge who is elected in the White
districts would not be accountable to a minority member appearing before her;
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Even though the De Grandy Court cautions against creating
majority-minority districts,1 6 evidence of racial polarization and
existing discrimination compels most courts to prefer single-
member districts to ensure representation of minority voters. A
court will create single-member districts without examining
countervailing circumstances that would demonstrate the minority
achievements in the districting scheme unless a state has a strong
interest in maintaining an at-large or multi-member electoral
scheme. 
157
C. Effect of Maximization of Minority Voting Strength
Districting plans that maximize the number of majority-minority
districts substantially above their proportional levels exceed the
requirements of the Voting Rights Act'58 and may violate the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. Justice Souter did not
address the implications of maximizing minority districts, but
merely claims that maximization is an "absurd suggestion."' 59
Justice Souter explained why such a plan was absurd in his dissent
in Shaw v Reno:
161
[A] distinction between districting and most other govern-
mental decisions in which race has figured is that those
other decisions using racial criteria characteristically occur
and it would be inefficient, and further entrench racial tensions, to transfer all
cases that involve a minority party to a minority judge. Id.
"56 Johnson v. De Grandy, 114 S. Ct. 2647, 2661 (1994). The Court
encourages cross-racial coalition building to eventually eliminate the need for
majority-minority districts. Id
' De Grandy does not materially alter the method for determining
violations of § 2 once the Gingles conditions have been met. Even though it is
not difficult to establish a dilution claim in an at-large or multi-member district,
these devices are not per se violations of § 2. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30,
48 (1986).
' See Johnson v. Miller, 864 F. Supp. 1354, 1379, stay granted, 115 S. Ct.
36 (1994) (stating that even though a state may create proportional majority-
minority districts, neither the Voting Rights Act nor the Constitution requires
such action).
9 De Grandy, 114 S. Ct. at 2660.
160 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993).
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in circumstances in which the use of race to the advantage
of one person is necessarily at the obvious expense of a
member of a different race. . . In districting, by contrast,
the mere placement of an individual in one district instead
of another denies no one a right or benefit provided to
others. '6
Justice Thomas correctly maintains that this "dividing line" between
fairness and absurdity is proportionality.'62 In United Jewish
Organizations v Carey,'63 the Court held that the attorney gen-
eral had complied with the Voting Rights Act when he created an
African American majority-minority district by splitting a district
comprised of Hasidic Jews."6 Even though race was taken into
account in this decision, it did not "minimize or unfairly cancel out
white voting strength." 6 ' However, when the state maximizes the
representation of a minority, it reduces the majority's opportunity
to elect candidates; thus, a member of the majority has a cognizable
injury under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.
66
To avoid section 2 litigation, a state or political subdivision
must create majority-minority districts in proportion to the number
of members of the minority population. Creating a proportional
number of districts directly consolidates and limits representation
161 Id. at 2846 (Souter, J., dissenting).
162 "Greater deviations from proportionality may appear more patently
'absurd' than lesser, but the dividing line between what seems fair and what does
not remains the same. The driving principle is proportionality." Holder v. Hall,
114 S. Ct. 2581, 2617 (1994) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
16' 430 U.S. 144 (1977).
164 Id. at 162-63.
161 Id. at 165. If a state changes its electoral system from an at-large district
to single-member districts, majority voters will lose substantial representation.
However, as long as the minority or majority is limited by its proportional share
of districts, the majority is not injured. Id. at 167.
166 If a member of the majority "can show that a redistricting plan has
assigned him to vote in a particular district at least in part because of his race
[he] has standing to challenge [the redistricting scheme], even if he cannot show
that it caused any concrete injury to his political interests." Shaw v. Hunt, 861
F. Supp. 408, 426 (E.D.N.C. 1994), petition for cert. filed, 63 U.S.L.W. 3439
(U.S. Nov. 21, 1994) (No. 92-202). The concrete injury stems from the indignity
that one suffers when one is distinguished because of race. Id.
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of minority interests to a few majority-minority districts. For
example, in Barnett v Daley,167 the defendants were accused of
maintaining proportional apportionment for an unlawful pur-
pose.1 68 The Chicago City Council is comprised of fifty aldermen,
each elected from a single-member district. 169 The plaintiff
claimed that the districting plan was purposely drawn to limit the
African American minority to a proportional number of majority-
minority districts, while the White majority had control of a
number of districts that was eight percent above its number in the
population. 7 ° However, the court of appeals determined that the
disparity was caused by the requirement of a super-majority in the
African American districts and a small majority in the White
districts.' 71 If it was discovered that the White members of the
council or the White voters purposely limited the African American
majority's districts to ensure dominance of the White majority in
the city council, then the plaintiff would have a claim under the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. 172 However, the city
council or the court could not maximize the number of African
American majority-minority districts without having a detrimental
effect on the White and the Hispanic population by violating their
167 32 F.3d 1196 (7th Cir. 1994).
168 This case was on appeal from the District Court for the Northern District
of Illinois, which dismissed the case for failure to state a claim. The Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and remanded to determine whether
unconstitutional racial gerrymandering existed or if African Americans did not
have an equal opportunity to participate in the political process. Id at 1203.
169 Id. at 1197.
170 The voting-age population of Chicago is comprised of 38.6% Black,
37.9% White and 19.6% Hispanic. They control 19, 23, and 8 districts
respectively. Id. at 1198. Black plaintiffs claim that 24 Black super-majority
wards could be created. Id.
171 Barnett v. Daley, 32 F.3d 1196, 1200 (7th Cir. 1994).
172 Id. at 1202. The circuit court held that proportionality would not be a
defense to such an action. However, in this situation, the evidence for a § 2
claim might be legislative intent rather than the effects of past or present
discrimination. Thus, the plaintiffs must establish the necessary level of proof to
deduce that the legislature purposely placed a cap on minority districts to ensure
dominance of the council. Id. at 1202-03.
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constitutional right to equal protection.11 3 Thus, even if a
violation is established, the remedy would take into account the
entire population with the exception of the Black minority, which
already controls its proportionate number of districts.'74
The Supreme Court in De Grandy warned of such a situation
when the state would have an "irresistible inducement" to create
majority-minority districts even where it would not be necessary to
ensure political opportunity.75 Although single-member districts
are encouraged by the first prong of the Gingles test, 176 these
districts do not always benefit the minority. The main argument
against single-member districts is that they waste votes for the
minority interests in return for a modicum of representation. 17 In
the absence of overt voting impediments, single-member districts
would not benefit the minority whenever a protected population
becomes the majority or when effective influence districts could be
created to give minorities an effective political voice. 17  In
addition, the creation of African American majority-minority
districts concentrates Democratic votes in a few districts, while
173 Id. at 1199. The Seventh Circuit believes that proportionality is an
unreasonable goal. "[T]he geographical distribution of a population as well as the
legitimate claims of other racial or ethnic groups may make it impossible to give
each racial group voting power proportional to its share of the total or voting-age
population." Id. at 1202.
174 Id. at 1203.
'71 Johnson v. De Grandy, 114 S. Ct. 2647, 2661 (1994).
176 Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50 n.17 (1986).
177 Professor Lani Guinier opposes creating single-member districts to ensure
minority representation. According to Professor Guinier, a citizen's vote may be
wasted in three ways. First, one who votes for the losing candidate does not have
direct representation of that voter's interests. Second, winning votes in a
majority-minority district above the electoral margin are wasted because the
accumulation of votes in one district dilutes the minority's interest jurisdiction-
wide. Third, concentration of minority votes in a few districts maximizes
majority representation in many districts, thus reproducing this effect at the
legislative level and disenfranchising minority legislators. Lani Guinier, Groups,
Representation, and Race-Conscious Districting: A Case of the Emperor's
Clothes, 71 TEx. L. REv. 1589, 1613-14 (1993).
178 See supra text accompanying note 123.
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allowing Republicans to gain a majority in more districts.'79
Thus, the few minority representatives that are elected are vastly
outnumbered by the majority representatives who do not share
interests with the minority, in contrast to a greater number of
moderate representatives that embody a cross-section of the
population. If legislatures are motivated to create majority-minority
districts to avoid section 2 litigation, minorities will be isolated
solely to single-member districts.
D. Effect of Proportionality in Race-Conscious Districting
The goal of Gingles and its progeny is to create proportional,
majority-minority, single-member districting plans. The thrust of a
dilution claim is whether a minority population has electoral
opportunity in proportion to its voting-age population.' The
Court in Johnson v De Grandy attempts to shift the emphasis of a
dilution claim from racial polarization and political cohesion
determined by statistical analysis of electoral results to a compre-
hensive review of the actual circumstances involved within the state
or political subdivision. 8 ' De Grandy recognizes proportionality
as a factor in the totality of the circumstances to determine if a
minority has had political opportunity within the districting
179 Some commentators speculate that the "Republican tidal wave" in the
1994 elections was caused by the creation of minority-majority districts that
removed African American Democratic voters from districts that subsequently
elected Republican representatives. Steven A. Holmes, Did Racial Redistricting
Undermine Democrats?, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 13, 1994, at 32. Contra Steven A.
Holmes, Civil Rights Group Disputes Election Analyses on Black Districts, N.Y.
TIMEs, Dec. 1, 1994, at A15 (reporting that only a small fraction of the losses
were due to the reconfiguration of district lines). "'It's like someone took away
a couple of sandbags in front of your house, and then a 30-foot tidal wave came
along,' said one [Legal Defense Fund] lawyer, Eric Schnapper. 'Was the removal
of two sandbags a factor? Absolutely not; the house was gone no matter what."'
Id.
"'o See, e.g., Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 85 (1986) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) (finding that the majority's decision would create a right to
proportional representation for any minority group that can satisfy the three
Gingles factors).
181 See Johnson v. De Grandy, 114 S. Ct. 2647, 2657 (1994).
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plan, 8 2 but its unfortunate consequence is the continuation of
race-conscious districting in order to create a violation-free
districting plan. The Court questions the creation of majority-
minority districts as a remedy and encourages the creation of cross-
racial coalitions, but it does not give any guidance on how cross-
racial districts will pass scrutiny under the Voting Rights Act. i8 3
E. Fashioning a Remedy that Is Consistent with the Voting
Rights Act and the Constitution
A violation of the Voting Rights Act is determined by examin-
ing all aspects of the relationship between the minority groups and
the majority group; however, a remedy to the Voting Rights Act
should not exacerbate differences by segregating racial groups into
different districts. Strict scrutiny of a governmental action requires
that this action be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state
interest.8 4 If a violation is established, a court or legislature is
required to search for narrowly tailored alternatives to racially-
based electoral schemes.8 5 If no alternatives can be devised to
represent minority interests, only then may majority-minority
districts be constructed. Such alternative factors other than race
may include common political or social beliefs and economic
conditions.
Race is not, and must not be allowed to become, the sole
defining characteristic by which we judge individual
citizens or reapportionment plans. There are a multitude of
other factors that have a profound influence on who we
are, as well as how we vote. In evaluating whether a
particular group has been afforded a fair opportunity to
elect representatives of its choice, justice requires a
182 Id. at 2661.
's "[T]he degree of probative value assigned to proportionality may vary
with other facts. No single statistic provides courts with a short-cut to determine
whether a set of single-member districts unlawfully diluted minority voting
strength." Id. at 2661-62.
184 See supra notes 50-54 and accompanying text.
18 See supra notes 50-54 and accompanying text.
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consideration of these other, complex factors in addition to
racial concerns.
8 6
In reality, race is used from the inception of the redistricting
process. Computer technology has reached a point in which racial
and ethnic information is available on a block-by-block level. 8 7
Moreover, these programs do not take interests other than popula-
tion, race and compactness to delineate district lines into ac-
count.' Districting plans that use race as a proxy for interests
without searching for alternate plans8 9 should be invalid under
the Equal Protection Clause.
One attractive alternative would be to create influence districts
where the minority would have an opportunity to build a coalition
with a sympathetic portion of the majority to win elections.' 90
The effect of this type of districting would integrate the political
process and give minorities adequate representation. More impor-
tantly, the minority would not be consigned to influence that is
limited to its proportional number in the population.
16 NAACP v. Austin, 857 F. Supp. 560, 578 (E.D. Mich. 1994).
' Vera v. Richards, 861 F. Supp. 1304, 1318. (S.D. Tex. 1994) The
congressional districting software analyzed by the district court was REDAPPL.
Id at 1314. "If the Legislature intended to allocate voters on the basis of race,
REDAPPL certainly provided a readily available, efficient means of doing so."
Id. at 1318.
188 See Arthur J. Anderson & William S. Dahlstrom, Technological
Gerrymandering: How Computers Can Be Used in the Redistricting Process to
Comply with Judicial Criteria, 22 URB. LAW. 59 (1990).
"89 Viable plans could be determined by examining socio-economic factors
of the area, drive-by knowledge and the personal knowledge of the legislator of
the constituents of her district. Vera, 861 F. Supp. at 1336.
9' For an influence group to be effective in electing a coalition candidate,
the minority population must be politically cohesive and the majority must not
be politically cohesive. J. Morgan Kousser, Beyond Gingles: Influence Districts
and the Pragmatic Tradition in Voting Rights Law, 27 U.S.F. L. REV. 551, 563
(1993). "As minority group cohesiveness increases and majority group cohesive-
ness declines, the level of minority group concentration necessary to elect the
choice of that group declines, and vice versa." Id
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CONCLUSION
The U.S. Supreme Court in Johnson v De Grandy vacillated
between the desire to give minorities a proportional opportunity to
elect representatives and the goal of building a society where race
does not affect decisionmaking. However, the Court failed to create
a test that will satisfy these goals, leaving the lower courts without
clear guidelines for determining violations of section 2 of the
Voting Rights Act. The Court signals acceptance of coalitions that
would satisfy the requirements of the Voting Rights Act, but it
continues to rely on proportionality of race to establish a violation.
To solve this problem, the Court must establish a test which
determines a minority group's actual political opportunity by
analyzing minority interests rather than concentrating on race as a
proxy for interests.
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